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This paper analyzes individual decisions to participate in an activity and the aggregation of
those decisions when individuals gather information about the outcomes and choices of (a few)
others in their social network. In this environment, aggregate participation rates are generally
ine±cient. Increasing the size of social networks does not necessarily increase e±ciency and
can lead to less e±cient long-run outcomes. Both subsidies for participation and penalties for
non-participation can increase participation rates, though not necessarily by the same amount.
Punishing non-participation has much greater e®ects on participation rates than rewarding
participation when current rates are very low. A program that provides youth with mentors
who have participated themselves can increase participation rates, especially when those rates
are low. Finally, communities plagued by the °ight of successful participants will experience
lower short- and long-run participation rates.
1 Introduction
Economic models typically assume that decision makers are fully informed, rationally process all
information, and generally make the `right' economic decision. Yet, for many decisions like ¯nishing
high school, attending college, joining a gang, taking drugs, or engaging in premarital sex, youth
possess limited information about the potential outcomes of their choices. Furthermore, much of
that information seems to come from older friends, neighbors, acquaintances, and parents who have
already made this decision and can o®er their advice. In short, youth look to role models and their
social networks for advice.
To the extent that social networks are drawn from the neighborhoods in which youth live, the
information and choices of youth will depend critically on the choices made by and outcomes of
others in their neighborhood. This does not bode well for youth growing up in impoverished ghetto
neighborhoods, as one such youth explains
¤Much of this work was completed while Lee Heavner was at the A.B. Freeman School of Business, Tulane
University. We thank participants at the 2000 SED Conference in Costa Rica and the University of Rochester
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1Our neighborhoods will only show us so much...See, I'm twenty-one years old and already
an OG [original gangster { someone who has been in a gang for a number of years]...The
OG's is getting a little bit younger, and I helped contribute to that because the younger
ones were looking up to me just as I was looking up to older people. All I saw for a long
time was people trying to get over and hustle, just hustle, hustle. I never seen no doctor
get up at three in the morning, wash o® his car, take his briefcase and his stethoscope,
and go straight to the hospital. I didn't see no lawyers, no rocket scientists. All I seen
was just somebody trying to get over. (Marshall and Wheeler, 1996)
Attempting to better understand these issues, this paper examines the evolution of community
outcomes and the role of government policy when information is transmitted imperfectly through
social networks. While standard economic models emphasize how heterogeneous tastes and abilities
can lead to di®erent choices across individuals, our model focuses on the role of heterogeneity in
information received by decision makers. Many of our model's implications di®er markedly from
the predictions of models with fully informed decision makers.
A number of recent theoretical papers have studied the aggregation of decisions when individ-
uals are not fully informed about their choices. The information cascade literature has examined
decision-making when individuals sequentially choose whether or not to take some action based on
their own private signals and the history of actions taken by their predecessors (e.g. Banerjee, 1992,
and Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992).1 In related work, Ellison and Fudenberg (1993,
1995) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (1999) consider the aggregation of decisions and information
when a large number of decision makers receive signals about the payo®s to di®erent choices and
know the choices made by individuals during the previous period (but they do not observe the entire
history of choices), which they refer to as word-of-mouth learning. This literature has primarily
focused on understanding when economies characterized by limited information transmission con-
verge to an equilibrium of decision making conformity in which decision makers ignore their own
private signals.
Following the theoretical interest in social networks, a number of recent empirical papers have
empirically examined the role of social information transmission in a variety of contexts. Most have
concluded that learning from others is an important determinant of individual decisions, although
little is known about the actual decision rules used by agents.2 Contrary to the predictions of
1See Bikchandani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1998) for an excellent discussion of this literature.
2Empirical ¯ndings suggest that social learning may play an important role in the decision to use contracep-
tion (Munshi and Myaux, 2000), criminal activity (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman, 1996), welfare participation
2the information cascade and word-of-mouth learning literatures; however, it is rare to observe
any (interesting) choice for which all individuals, even within homogenous groups, make the same
decision. In order to analyze the e®ects of policy intervention and network size on aggregate
outcomes, we, therefore, develop a model in which information is imperfectly transmitted through
interactions with others and in which identical individuals sometimes make di®erent choices even
in the long-run steady state. The policies we examine are either ill-suited for study in models with
full information or produce very di®erent e®ects when information is transmitted through social
networks.
We model the decision to participate in an activity when decision makers learn about the
participation choices and receive signals about the payo®s associated with those choices from a small
sample of individuals from the previous generation. Our framework di®ers from the information
cascade literature and Banerjee and Fudenberg (1999) in that we assume that each generation
uses the same decision rule for participation. This assumption is appropriate when individuals
from di®erent generations have similar prior beliefs about the state of the current regime or when
individuals are limited in their abilities to compute complex Bayesian decision rules and, instead,
use simple rules of thumb (as assumed in Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993, 1995). Our decision process
is also general enough to account for individual tastes for conformity or the fact that \...a person's
patterns and norms of behavior tend to be shaped by those with which he or she has the most
frequent or sustained contact and interaction." (Wilson, 1986, p. 61) Because we impose very few
assumptions on the form of the decision rule, our results apply to a wide class of social learning
models.
We ¯nd that the economy will only converge to an equilibrium in which all individuals make
the same choice if the `must-see' to choose assumption (i.e. individuals never choose an option that
they do not observe in their sample) of Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) is imposed. Because
full conformity is an unrealistic prediction for most interesting social and economic problems, we
relax this assumption in our analysis. Our main results focus on understanding how various policies
e®ect both short- and long-run aggregate outcomes.
Our model generates many interesting predictions that contrast with the predictions of tradi-
tional economic models with fully informed decision makers. The imperfect transmission of in-
formation through social networks generally causes some individuals not to participate even when
(Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan, 2000), decisions about employment retirement plans (Du°o and Saez, 2000)
and health insurance plans (Sorensen, 2001), stock market participation (Hong, Kubik, and Stein, 2001), and techno-
logical adoption in agriculture (Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995, and Conley and Udry, 2001, 2002). See Manski (1993)
for an analysis of identi¯cation and estimation of actual social learning decision rules.
3participation is ex ante optimal. This implies that there may be a positive role for government
intervention. For example, subsidizing the best choice or punishing an inferior one can induce more
individuals to make the right decision.
Contrary to conventional wisdom based on models with fully informed decision makers, aggre-
gate choices need not respond symmetrically to changes in the payo®s of di®erent alternatives when
information is transmitted through social networks. For example, an increase in the earnings of
high school graduates need not have the same impact on graduation rates as a similar decrease
in earnings among drop outs { observing the net change in the graduate - drop out earnings dif-
ferential is not su±cient to determine the aggregate response. The key to this asymmetry lies in
the information (or, more appropriately, lack of information) people obtain from their observation
sample. When aggregate graduation rates are low, most decision makers observe samples with very
few graduates. As a result, only limited information about an increase in the earnings of gradu-
ates will reach them. On the other hand, information about a reduction in the earnings of drop
outs will be conveyed clearly. The same reasoning shows that communities with high graduation
rates will respond more to improvements in the earnings of graduates and less to reductions in the
earnings of drop outs. Therefore, policies that improve the outcomes of graduates may successfully
reduce drop out rates in middle and upper class communities while failing to do so in disadvantaged
communities.
The problems associated with imperfect information transmission are not necessarily improved
by blindly increasing the size of social networks (the number of people agents receive signals from).
But, selectively augmenting social networks with individuals who have made good decisions, as
a mentor program might do, o®ers promise. Empirically, mentor programs have been introduced
to disadvantaged communities where high school drop out and crime rates are high. Tierney and
Grossman (1995) ¯nd that the well-known Big Brothers/Big Sisters program reduces drug/alcohol
use and violence while increasing school attendance and average grade levels.3 We model mentor
programs by adding a randomly drawn participant to each decision maker's observation sample.
In communities with low aggregate participation rates, this can substantially improve information
about the bene¯ts of participation and induce many more to choose participation. The e®ects are
substantially weaker in areas with already high participation rates.
Wilson (1987) has identi¯ed the out°ow of successful blacks from ghetto neighborhoods as
3Johnson (1998) reports that the probability of a successful mentoring relationship is positively related to simi-
larities between the mentor and youth, which suggests that youth rely more on information from others with similar
attributes.
4an important cause for the continued problems faced by these communities. We study how this
phenomenon a®ects short- and long-term participation rates and ¯nd that both are reduced. In
contrast, communities in which participants are particularly active in the social networks of youth
will experience higher short- and long-term participation rates. In contrast to the previously de¯ned
mentor programs, a policy that encourages active involvement of participants in their communities
will improve the outcomes most in neighborhoods with intermediate aggregate participation rates.
The next section describes a general model of social networks and identi¯es some important
properties of the economy. Section 3 applies the model to analyze the decision to graduate from
high school using a decision rule based on that of Ellison and Fudenberg (1993). We explore the
a®ects of network size, mentors, an out°ow of participants, and changes in the returns to di®erent
choices on short- and long-term aggregate outcomes. We o®er some concluding remarks in the ¯nal
section.
2 A General Model of Social Networks
We consider an environment in which individuals must choose whether or not to participate in an
activity, focusing on situations in which: (i) accurate aggregate statistics either do not exist or
individual heterogeneity makes nationwide statistics uninformative for individual decision makers;
and (ii) individuals cannot acquire information from their own previous experiences.4 It seems best
to consider each local community as a separate economy, since in this case, individuals are likely
to be similar to and rely on the information provided by other individuals within that commu-
nity.5 While national statistics about education, crime, teen pregnancy, etc. are publicly available,
community-level statistics on these types of activities are more di±cult to come by.
We recognize that decision makers infer information from observed payo®s as well as from ob-
served participation rates. Observed outcomes of individuals from an earlier generation provide
direct information about one's own expected outcomes, and observed participation rates give the
fraction of previous decision makers that expected participation to be optimal. Intuitively, ob-
served participation rates contain information about historical returns from participating, since
individuals in the observed sample based their participation decisions on earlier observed payo®s
and participation rates. The relative popularity of a choice in one's own sample serves as a proxy
for that option's historical performance.
4In a context with repeated decisions, Lochner (2001) shows that individuals learn about the probability of arrest
from their own experiences with crime and whether or not they are arrested.
5For example, national measures of the earnings of high school and college graduates may be only weakly related
to the potential earnings opportunities for youth growing up in inner city ghettos.
5To focus on the e®ects of limited information transmission, we study individuals that are ho-
mogeneous in tastes and abilities. We also abstract from the decision to acquire information by
assuming that each decision maker randomly samples n independent members of the previous gen-
eration. (We emphasize observation samples that are small but greater than one.) A decision maker
learns the participation choices and the payo®s associated with each individual he samples. We
follow Banerjee and Fudenberg (1999) and Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995) in assuming that
decision makers cannot access the information used by previous decision makers.6
Let x denote the number of observed sample members who participated. Participating individ-
ual i conveys the payo® signal ¼i
p = µp + "i
p, and non-participating individual j conveys the payo®
signal ¼
j
np = µnp + "
j
np where the "a are independent and identically distributed in the population
as N(0;¾2
a) for a 2 fp;npg. The "a terms represent a combination of randomness in returns and
noise in the payo® signals.7 Let µ ´ µp ¡µnp represent the expected gain from participating, which
is common across all individuals. As a normalization, assume that µ > 0, so that participation is
always the ex ante optimal choice. In a world with full information, everyone would choose to par-
ticipate and the economy would always be e±cient (i.e. everyone would make the ex ante optimal
choice).
Consider the following individual decision rule for participation:




¹ ¼p ¸ °p(n) when x = n
¹ ¼p ¸ °(¹ ¼np;x;n) when x 2 [1;n ¡ 1]
¹ ¼np < °np(n) when x = 0;
where °p(n), °np(n), and °(¹ ¼np;x;n) are exogenously given threshold functions. We assume that °
is weakly increasing in ¹ ¼np and would generally expect that it is weakly decreasing in x. We make
no assumptions about the e®ects of network size (n) on the decision rule. Individuals who observe
only participants will choose to participate themselves as long as the average outcome signal for
participants, ¹ ¼p, is high enough, while those who only observe non-participants will choose to par-
ticipate if the average outcome signal for observed non-participants, ¹ ¼np, is low enough. Individuals
observing a sample consisting of both participants and non-participants will choose to participate
when the average participant signal is su±ciently high, where higher signaled payo®s from non-
participants and a lower observed participation rate increase the minimum average participant
6This assumption is most reasonable when (i) decision makers have little incentive to record such information
after making their decision and (ii) information acquisition is too costly (relative to its rewards) for an organization
to pro¯t from recording and communicating such information.
7The source of variation is irrelevant for the individual decision process and the dynamics of the aggregate system
as long as it does not a®ect individual decision rules. Variation may also be due to unknown ex ante heterogeneity,
which should not a®ect decisions as long as it is not recognized by decision makers.
6payo® signal that will induce participation.
This decision rule may re°ect a simple rule-of-thumb decision process due to bounded rationality
as in Ellison and Fudenberg (1993, 1995). Or, it may represent an underlying Bayesian decision
process where individuals from all generations have the same set of prior beliefs over (µa;"a) for
a 2 fp;npg and over the number of generations that have passed since the current (µ;") regime
began.8 Finally, it may simply represent individual tastes for conformity or the social transmission
of norms and values across people.
Given the decision rule described above and the independence of outcome signals across in-
dividuals, the probability that an individual observing x participants will choose to participate
themselves is given by ¹x where
¹x =
8
> > > > > <































when x = 0;
and ©(¢) and Á(¢) represent the standard normal cdf and pdf, respectively.
Aggregate Participation Rates
Assuming that individual samples are randomly drawn from a large population, we can determine
the evolution of the aggregate participation rate using the law of large numbers. If y is the current
population participation rate, then the probability an individual observes j participants in his
sample is















8For example, suppose individuals know the joint distribution of ("p;"np) and that this distribution is time
invariant. If regimes characterized by (µp;µnp) can change at any time with some probability q, each regime is
independent of the entire history, individuals do not know when a regime change occurs, and all individuals have the
same prior beliefs about q and the distribution from which (µp;µnp) is drawn, then individuals from each generation
will face the same decision problem and will follow the same Bayesian decision rule. It is important that individuals
are unaware of the date when regimes begin; otherwise Bayesian decision rules will di®er across generations { later
generations will place more importance on observed participation rates (e.g. Banerjee and Fudenberg, 1999). While
we do not explicitly analyze a stochastic economy, one can think of the steady states in our model applying within
any given regime.
7The economy will be in steady state if ¢(y) ´ y0 ¡y = 0. The following proposition establishes
that neither full participation nor zero participation will be steady states when °p(n) > ¡1 and
°np(n) > ¡1.
Proposition 1. (i) If °p(n) > ¡1, then y = 1 is not a steady state. (ii) If °np(n) > ¡1, then
y = 0 is not a steady state. (iii) If °p(n) > ¡1 and °np(n) > ¡1, then there must exist at least
one interior steady state, y¤, satisfying y¤ 2 (0;1).
Proof: (i) ¢(0) = ¹0 > 0 when °np(n) > ¡1, and (ii) ¢(1) = ¹n ¡ 1 < 0 when °p(n) > ¡1. (iii)
By the Intermediate Value Theorem, there must be some y 2 (0;1) for which ¢(y) = 0. 2
Thus, the economy will be ine±cient (i.e. some individuals will not participate even though
participation is ex ante optimal) unless individuals use a `must see' to choose decision rule in which
case they never choose an option they do not observe in their sample (i.e. °p(n) = °np(n) = ¡1).
If individuals do use a `must see' decision rule, then both zero and full participation are possible
steady states; although they are unlikely to be stable unless the sample participation rate plays a
strong role in the decision process.9
When individuals may choose an option they do not observe, there will be at least one interior
steady state with partial participation, and there may be as many as n steady states (no more than
n
2 +1 can be stable). Consequently, there will be few stable steady states when networks are small.
Since µ > 0, a higher participation rate represents a more e±cient economy. Proposition
2 shows that by increasing µ, either by subsidizing participants or by taxing non-participants,
the government can increase aggregate participation rates and improve e±ciency of the economy
(ignoring any deadweight losses associated with such policies). Of course, these policies will also
increase ex post inequality between participants and non-participants.











. (iii) For almost every y, changes in participation rates are not equivalent for the







. (iv) An increase (decrease) in µ need
not increase (decrease) changes in the participation rate.
Proof: See Appendix A.
9In our context, a steady state is stable if the system returns to the same steady state after small perturbations.
The zero participation steady state will be stable if and only if ¹1 < 1=n and full participation will be a stable steady
state if and only if ¹n¡1 > (n ¡ 1)=n. An interior steady state will only be stable if
@¢(y)
@y jy=y¤ < 0.
8As one would expect, increases in the payo®s to participants and reductions in the payo®s to non-
participants both weakly increase aggregate participation rates. However, in contrast to standard
models with fully informed decision makers, increases in participation payo®s and reductions in non-
participation payo®s of the same magnitude will have di®erential e®ects on aggregate participation
rates. Thus, it matters if the return to participation increases because participants have become
better o® or if it is because non-participants have become worse o®. Put another way, net changes
in payo®s are not enough to determine whether aggregate participation rates increase or decrease.
The key to this asymmetric response lies in the information decision makers obtain from their
social networks and not necessarily in any asymmetry of individual decision rules. The di®erential
e®ects of changes in µp and µnp are most clear at very high and low participation rates. For
example, when the participation rate is very high, an increase in the payo® to participation will be
immediately recognized by most decision makers, since they will primarily observe participants in
their network sample. However, a reduction in non-participant payo®s will go largely unnoticed,
since few individuals will observe any non-participants in their sample. Consequently, an equal
increase in participant and non-participant payo®s (leaving µ unchanged) will increase changes in
participation rates when current participation rates are high and will reduce those changes when
current participation rates are low. A steady state participation rate that is high will increase,
while a low steady state participation rate will decline in response to increases in payo®s to both
participation and non-participation.
3 An Example
In this section, we study the a®ect of changes in the payo®s to di®erent choices, mentors, network
size, and an out°ow of participants on aggregate participation rates using a simple rule-of-thumb
decision rule for participation based on Ellison and Fudenberg (1993). Speci¯cally, assume that
°(¹ ¼np;x;n) = ¹ ¼np +m(1¡2x
n), where m is a non-negative constant determining how much weight
decision makers place on the information contained in the observed participation rate. Individuals
observing mixed samples of participants and non-participants, therefore, choose to participate if
the di®erence in average observed payo®s (¹ ¼p¡ ¹ ¼np) exceeds the cuto® m(1¡2x
n). We assume that
°np and °p are equal, ¯nite constants, and independent of n.10
This decision rule provides a simple way to incorporate the information contained in observed
returns and observed participation rates (it may also incorporate tastes for conformity). The
10See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion.
9parameter m determines the importance of the sample participation rate in determining individual
decisions when decision makers observe a mixed sample of participants and non-participants. For m
very large, individuals will simply follow the choice made by the majority of their sample regardless
of the payo® signals they receive. For m = 0, individuals only compare the payo® signals they
observe for participants and non-participants, ignoring the sample participation rate altogether.
Even though the decision rule treats ¹ ¼p and ¹ ¼np symmetrically, we will observe asymmetric responses
to changes in µp and µnp as described earlier in Proposition 2.
Any number of patterns for ¢(y) can be generated by this model depending on the parame-
terization. While the broad issues we discuss are not sensitive to the parameters we choose, it is
instructive to present a speci¯c example. We apply the model to the high school graduation deci-
sion, noting that evidence presented in Betts (1996) and Dominitz and Manski (1996) suggests that
youth are not fully informed about the earnings associated with di®erent education levels. Betts
(1996) also demonstrates that the errors in student earnings expectations are positively correlated
with parental earnings levels, suggesting that parents are in their children's social networks. We
choose parameter values for our model that produce a pattern consistent with the 1970-80 changes
in high school graduation rates (among young white men) across metropolitan areas in the U.S. and
the average earnings of high school graduates and drop outs in 1970. As Figure 1 shows, high school
graduation rates increased much more from 1970 to 1980 among young men living in metropolitan
areas with lower initial graduation rates than those living in areas with high graduation rates.
While we recognize that many models might explain this pattern, we focus exclusively on the role
of social networks in what follows.11
Linking the model to our example, let participation represent the decision to ¯nish high school
and non-participation represent the decision to drop out. Then, we set µp = 8:595 and µnp = 8:352
based on average log earnings among young graduates and drop outs. We also assume a network
size of n = 6 along with m = ¾p = ¾np = 1 for our base case. (See Appendix B for further details
on the base case parameterization.) As seen in Figure 2, our base case parameter values produce
a pattern for ¢(y) like that of Figure 1 (note that Figure 1 only shows ¢(y) for a limited range of
y values for which data are available). The only steady state participation rate is approximately
y¤ = 0:85, and it is stable. Changes in the participation rate, ¢(y), are initially increasing for very
11We note that two obvious explanations are not supported by the data. First, measurement error in graduation
rates across metropolitan areas cannot fully explain the negative correlation between changes in graduation rates and
initial rates. Second, the pattern in Figure 1 is not generated by di®erential changes in the rate of return to high
school completion across metropolitan areas. See Appendix B for a more detailed discussion of these empirical issues
and the Census data used to generate Figure 1.
10Figure 1: 1970-80 Change in High School Graduation Rates by 1970 High School Graduation Rates
(White Males Ages 20-25 by Metropolitan Area)
11Figure 2: The E®ects of Changes in Payo®s to Participation and Non-Participation
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low y, then declining thereafter. Thus, convergence to the steady state from a very low participation
rate will be slow at ¯rst, increasing until y = 0:2, then slowing down again until y settles at y¤.
To demonstrate the asymmetric response of ¢(y) and y¤ to changes in µp and µnp, Figure 2
also shows the e®ects of increasing the net payo® to graduation by 0.2 either by raising µp or
lowering µnp. While both changes increase ¢(y), the magnitude of the response depends on which
payo® has been changed and the current participation rate. An increase in µp has very small e®ects
when participation rates are low, while the largest e®ects of a decline in µnp occur for y < 0:5.
For y 2 (0:3;0:9), a change in either payo® produces a similar increase in ¢(y). Because the
initial steady state is very high, an increase in the payo® to participation increases the steady state
participation rate more than a decline in the payo® to non-participants.
Empirically, the wages of high school graduates and drop outs have changed considerably since
the 1960s (e.g. see Katz and Murphy, 1992). From 1963-71, wages increased substantially across all
education groups with very similar increases for both high school graduates and drop outs (around
17%). Despite a negligible change in relative wages over that period, the model predicts that
schooling should have declined (or increased at a slower rate) in communities with low graduation
rates while it should have increased in communities with very high graduation rates. In contrast,
the 1980s were characterized by falling wages among both graduates and drop outs (with slightly
12larger declines among drop outs), which should have produced gains in schooling for the most
disadvantaged communities while producing little change in graduation rates for the most educated
communities. More generally, declines in wages for both drop outs and graduates should lead to
faster convergence in graduation rates across communities, while increases in their wages should
slow convergence.
A policy that increases the earnings of graduates or punishes drop outs will not only increase
the steady state graduation rate, but it will also increase the rate at which graduation rates move
toward that steady state for most values of y.12 Interestingly, among communities with very low
graduation rates, punishing drop outs should generate greater increases in schooling early on than
a subsidy to graduates, so the quickest way to raise the graduation rates in such a community may
be to raise compulsory schooling ages or the severity of ¯nes associated with violating them.
The Size of Networks
Can we ensure full participation by simply increasing the size of networks, n? As Figure 3 shows,
over a large range of n, y¤ is, indeed, increasing in n. However, as n grows, so does the possibility
that other (lower) steady states emerge.13 For n = 50, two stable steady states exist, one with a
participation rate of 0.12 and a second with a participation rate of 0.95 (a third, unstable, steady
state also exists at a participation rate of 0.28). In this example, an economy that begins at
a low initial participation rate may settle at a low participation steady state when networks are
large.14 Thus, larger networks do not necessarily guarantee that the economy will be more e±cient.
Intuitively, when networks are very large and participation rates are very small, the `herding' e®ect
of observing mostly non-participants, which will be the case for most individuals when y is low,
can overwhelm the e®ect of observing better average payo® measures. On the other hand, when
participation rates are high, the `herding' e®ects work in favor of participation. (Similar tendencies
emerge when m is large.)
12Note that these results implicitly assume that individuals do not adjust their decision rules in response to the
policy. This assumption is appropriate when policies are unannounced or have indirect e®ects on the payo®s to
di®erent choices that are not easily recognized by decision makers. Examples might include the establishment of
empowerment zones in disadvantaged communities, increased enforcement of truancy laws, changes in school quality,
etc.
13For very large n, a full information model is likely to be more appropriate for studying individual decisions.
14With other parameterizations, multiple steady states may also exist for smaller network sizes.
13Figure 3: The E®ects of Network Size


















We next explore the potential for mentor programs to encourage youth to ¯nish high school. Figure
4 shows ¢(y) for the base case with n = 6 and a case where individuals observe an additional
person randomly selected from the population. Both ¢(y) and y¤ are quite similar for the two
cases, suggesting that a program which randomly selects mentors for youth should have little e®ect
on the economy.
We next analyze a program that provides youth with a mentor who is randomly drawn from
the population of participants, so all youth observe at least one participant in their network. We
explore two cases. Consider ¯rst the case in which individuals continue to use the same decision rule
as before. In this case (the dotted line), ¢(y) increases for all values of y, especially for lower values.
The steady state participation rate rises to about 0.9. Here, a mentor program not only increases the
number of participant payo® signals observed for decision makers, which improves each individual's
estimate of the payo® to participation, but it also increases the fraction of participants each decision
maker observes, which lowers the bar for participation. The former e®ect is particularly important
for those who would otherwise observe few participants, which explains why the e®ects are so large
when aggregate participation rates are low. In a sense, the latter e®ect assumes that youth are
unaware (or ignore) that mentors are drawn exclusively from the participant sample. Instead, youth
14Figure 4: The E®ects of Mentor Programs
















Participant Mentors (mentor’s decision is ignored)
may disregard the information provided by their mentor's participation decision and only use his
additional payo® signal. In other words, individuals may adjust their decision rule so that they
only consider non-mentors in computing their sample participation rate.15 In this case (the dashed
line), ¢(y) still increases substantially when aggregate participation rates are low, but there is little
e®ect when participation rates are above 20%.
The way mentors are chosen and the response of decision makers to that selection mechanism is
important. A program that randomly assigns a mentor from the population at large is equivalent
to an increase in the size of social networks and o®ers little additional information about the payo®s
to high school graduation when aggregate graduation rates are low, since few of the mentors will
actually be participants. However, a program that draws mentors from the pool of graduates can
have large e®ects in areas with very low graduation rates, since it provides information about the
payo®s to a choice most decision makers are likely to be uninformed about.16 Mentor programs
o®er a powerful way to improve outcomes in areas where graduation rates are quite low.
15Let ¹ ¼
m
p represent the average payo® among all observed participants including the mentor, and x represent the
number of observed participants (excluding the mentor). Then, an individual observing a sample with x 2 [0;n ¡ 1]
participants chooses to participate if and only if ¹ ¼
m
p ¡ ¹ ¼np ¸ m(1 ¡ 2
x
n) (individuals with x = 0 observe a single
participant signal from their mentor).
16Note that if prior beliefs are such that youth believe the payo®s to graduation are quite high (much higher than
they actually are), then a program that provides high school graduates as mentors may actually reduce the likelihood
that youth choose to graduate. With unbiased prior beliefs (or a symmetric decision rule), this is unlikely.
15Active and Inactive Participants
Wilson (1987) forcefully argues that the °ight of middle- and working-class blacks from inner city
neighborhoods has negatively impacted those communities by reducing the number of positive role
models for youth. This can be studied within our framework by assuming that some fraction of
participants become inactive or detached from the community. Speci¯cally, assume that only a
fraction » of participants remain in the population from which youth draw their network samples.17
As shown in Figure 5, which assumes that 10% of participants become inactive (» = 0:9), both short-
and long-term participation rates are negatively a®ected by the °ight of participants. The largest
impacts on short-term participation changes occur for intermediate values of y. If the participants
experiencing the highest payo®s are most likely to become inactive or leave the community, then the
negative impacts of their inactivity would be even greater. Disadvantaged communities plagued by
`brain drain' or an out°ow of successful adults will tend to improve at a slower rate and settle at a
worse long-run steady state than otherwise similar communities. On the other hand, communities
in which successful adults are more active will face better short- and long-run prospects as shown in
Figure 5 (represented by » = 1:1). In contrast to the mentor programs already discussed, however,
policies that generally encourage successful adults to become more active in their communities will
have their greatest impacts when participation rates are neither very high nor very low.
4 Conclusions
The way in which individuals gather information and make decisions has important implications
for policies designed to in°uence decisions to ¯nish high school, attend college, engage in crime,
etc. However, most existing economic research ignores the process of information acquisition by
assuming that individuals are fully informed about the potential outcomes of their choices. This
research cannot explain how mentor programs achieve their e®ects or why ghetto neighborhoods
plagued by the °ight of successful adults fail to improve. To address these shortcomings, we study
individual decisions when information is acquired from social networks. A number of our ¯ndings
can be useful for guiding policy in a variety of social contexts.
Our model of social networks suggests that steady state participation rates will generally be
ine±cient. When participation in an activity is optimal, subsidies to participants or penalties on
non-participants can improve the e±ciency of the economy. It is important to note, however, that









n¡j¹j where z = »y=(1 + (1 ¡ »)y). Whether those no longer in the network
pool actually leave the community or simply become detached is irrelevant here.
16Figure 5: Active and Inactive Participants


















the choice between these two policies matters, especially when participation rates are either very
low or very high. A subsidy for participants will have little e®ect on the economy when current
participation rates are low, while a penalty on non-participants will have its greatest impact in these
cases. The relative e®ectiveness of these policies is reversed when participation rates are high.
This asymmetry has important practical implications. For example, in areas where high school
graduation rates are low, a policy that punishes high school drop may increase graduation rates
more than a policy that rewards graduates. On the other hand, such a policy may have little e®ect
in communities with high graduation rates. Strict enforcement of compulsory schooling laws should,
therefore, boost graduation rates in disadvantaged communities while having little e®ect in middle
and upper class areas. Similarly, a policy that imposes stronger punishments on gang members is
likely to reduce gang membership more than programs that improve legitimate opportunities in
gang-infested neighborhoods. However, in areas with few gang problems, encouraging legitimate
opportunities can be more e®ective at slowing or preventing the growth of gangs. Finally, programs
that indirectly aid teenage mothers are unlikely to increase teen pregnancy in most communities
where few teenagers choose to have children, but they may substantially increase teen motherhood
in impoverished communities where teen pregnancy is already a problem.
We also ¯nd that e±ciency is not necessarily improved when networks are expanded. However,
17e®orts to supplement networks with mentors can be e®ective at raising participation rates if men-
tors are drawn from the pool of participants rather than the population at large. When aggregate
participation rates are low, the additional information about the payo®s to participation provided
by mentors who participated themselves can substantially increase participation rates. A mentor
program will be most e®ective in communities where youth are generally drawing their information
from a previous generation that was making suboptimal choices. So, providing youth in disadvan-
taged communities with mentors that ¯nished high school, attended college, and avoided drugs,
crime, and gangs is likely to improve aggregate outcomes in all of these dimensions. On the other
hand, disadvantaged communities plagued by the °ight of successful adults will improve at a slower
rate and settle at worse long-run outcomes than otherwise similar communities.
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@µp ¸ 0 and
@¢(y)
@µnp · 0. (iii) The previous equations imply that the magnitude
of each e®ect will di®er for nearly all y values. (iv) Given the above de¯nitions, it is possible to
increase both µp and µnp such that µ increases and ¢(y) decreases for some values of y. For other
values of y, a decrease in both µp and µnp such that µ increases can cause ¢(y) to decline. A
symmetric argument applies to reductions in µ. 2
21Appendix B
This appendix discusses the data used in generating Figure 1 and in determining the parameter
values used in the base case model of Section 3.
Census Data
Data on earnings, age, and education for white men are taken from the 1970 and 1980 Decennial
Censuses. In calculating high school graduation rates for Figure 1, we use white men ages 20-25.
Graduation rates (and their changes) for ¯fty-seven Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) with
250 or more observations are shown in the ¯gure, though the same pattern emerges when the entire
sample is used.
We ¯rst note that this pattern is not generated by di®erential changes in the rate of return
to high school completion across MSAs. A regression of 1970-80 changes in MSA high school
graduation rates on 1970-80 changes in the rate of return to high school18 and the 1970 graduation
rate produces an estimated e®ect of -0.035 (standard error of 0.035) for changes in returns and
-0.367 (standard error of 0.084) for the initial graduation rate.
While measurement error in graduation rates across MSAs will generate a negative relationship
between 1970-80 changes in graduation rates and 1970 graduation rates, we now show that this
can only explain a fraction of the negative correlation. In particular, we study the bias induced
when using sample graduation rates rather than true graduation rates to estimate the relationship
between ¢(y) and y. Let yj denote the true graduation rate in community j and ¹ yj = yj + ´j
the sample graduation rate taken from N random persons in that community; ´j represents iid
measurement error. If di
j is an indicator variable that equals one if individual i in community j
graduates and zero otherwise, then di













Suppose we are interested in estimating the relationship
¢(yj) = ® + ¯yj + !j;
18The returns to high school are estimated from MSA-level regressions of log wage earnings for white men ages
18-65 on indicators for education < 10 years, education = 10 or 11 years, education = 12 years, education = 13-15
years, and education ¸ 16 years, as well as experience (age - education - 6) and experience-squared. The coe±cients
on the indicator for 12 years of school for each MSA are used as measures of the return to high school.
22but we instead use OLS to estimate
¢(¹ yj) = ® + ¯¹ yj + ºj:
Assuming !j and ºj are iid errors independent of each other as well as yj, the OLS estimate of ¯






V ar(yj) + V ar(´j)
¶
: (2)
Assuming ¯ is negative, the OLS estimate provides an upper bound for the true ¯.
Given the upper bound on V ar(´j) from equation (1), we know that V ar(yj) ¸ V (¹ yj) ¡ 1
4N
and, therefore,
plim ^ ¯ ·
µ
4N ¢ V ar(¹ yj) ¡ 1
4N ¢ V ar(¹ yj)
¶
¯: (3)
Combining equations (2) and (3), we see that for ¯ < 0 and V ar(¹ yj) > 1
4N,
µ
4N ¢ V ar(¹ yj)
4N ¢ V ar(¹ yj) ¡ 1
¶
plim ^ ¯ · ¯ · plim ^ ¯:
Since we only use MSAs with N ¸ 250 and V ar(¹ y) = :002, any bias in estimating ¯ or in the
slope of ¢(y) in Figure 1 should be no greater than a factor of two. The empirical bias in the paper
is likely to be substantially smaller for two reasons: (1) N is much larger than 250 for most MSAs
in the sample and (2) V ar(´j) is likely to be considerably smaller than 0.25, since graduation rates
are much greater than 0.5.
Base Case Parameterization
In determining µp and µnp, we use the 1970 Census, regressing log wage earnings on indicators for
education < 10 years, education = 10 or 11 years, education = 12 years, education = 13-15 years,
and education ¸ 16 years, as well as experience (age - education - 6) and experience-squared. The
values µp = 8:595 and µnp = 8:352 are given by the coe±cients on the indicators for 10 or 11 years
of school and 12 years of school, respectively.
We then set n = 6, m = ¾2
p = ¾2
np = 1, and °np(n) = °p(n) = 7:8068 to produce a pattern for
¢(y) matching that of Figure 1.19
19Other parameterizations can also produce similar patterns over the limited range for y that is observed. The
base values for °
np(n) and °








2 . These thresholds are held ¯xed at their
base values when network sizes are adjusted in our policy experiments.
23